Canadian Health Care
The Universal Model
Evolving
Greg
Connolly 11/18/02
Global
Health Council
For over thirty years Canada has taken pride in its
universal health care program, Medicare.
This experiment in health care systems is founded on the principal that
every citizen should have equal access to high quality health care. But what was the nation’s pride has become
nation’s most controversial program.
Skyrocketing costs and plummeting satisfaction levels forecast a dire
future for Canadian Medicare. Public
consensus calls for fundamental changes to the system. An eighteen-month study ending in Roy
Romanow’s report, Building on Values: The
Future of Health Care in Canada, attempts to answer the calls for reform by
making a comprehensive series of suggestions for the renewal of the Medicare
system. A group of medical economists
are advising that Canada should introduce a Catastrophe Insurance/Medical
Savings Account model into the health care system. This dynamic time in the Canadian health care system is yielding
important lessons for the other nations of the world, who for many years have
looked to the Canadian model for health care.
The
Canadian Medicare System
“Our
proudest achievement in the well-being of Canadians has been in asserting that
illness is burden enough in itself.
Financial ruin must not compound it.
That is why Medicare has been called a sacred trust and we must not
allow that trust to be betrayed.”
--Canadian Justice Emmett Hall
In Canada,
health is viewed as a human right.
Using this philosophy as their guide, the Canadian government has
developed a socialized health care system that evolved from a small experiment
in Saskatchewan in the 30’s and 40’s, to the current Medicare system.[i] This system provides almost 32 million
people spread out over 10 million square kilometers with equal access to
government-funded health services.[ii]
The policy
of a universal health care system was solidified in the 1960’s with the passage
of two key acts. “The Hospital Insurance
and Diagnostic Services Act (1957)” and the “Medical Care Act (1968)” dictated
the terms for the Medicare system.
However, due to low compensation and a lack of incentives, medical
service providers, such as doctors and nurses, manipulated loopholes in the
legislation to increase their salaries.
Some providers introduced extra-billing, which was the direct charging
of extra fees to patients for insured services. User charges were another exploitation of the system. These were fees charged to the patients,
which were not covered by insurance.
For example, a patient could have been charged a user fee before being
given access to care by a doctor. The
problems of extra-billing and user charges were addressed by the “Canada Health
Act (1984).” This legislation penalized
such behaviors by allowing the national government to withhold payments to
provincial health departments equal to the amounts predicted that were charged
in extra billing and user charges. Once
the providers paid the provincial health ministers back the extra charges, then
the Government would release the withheld funds. This alleviated the problems of extra-billing and user-fees.
The hierarchy of the Canadian Medicare System cascades as such:
House and Senate, Governor in Council, Minister of Health, Provincial Health
Ministers, Provincial Health Insurance Nonprofit, Provider, Consumer. As a means of understanding this mechanism,
consider the following profile:
Philip Brodeur, of Quebec,
breaks his arm. He reports to the ER,
which, unfortunately is crowded.
Eventually he is treated, his paperwork is filed, and he goes home. His paperwork is then processed by the
hospital, and sent to the public provincial nonprofit health insurance agency,
called the Ministere de la Sante et des Services Sociaux (Ministry of Health
and Social Services). The insurance
agency then sends a payment to the doctor, and a payment to the hospital. The amount payable to the doctor is based on
the service provided, and the hospital is reimbursed for the materials
used. At the end of the year, the
public insurance agency reports the annual provincial health costs to the
national Ministry of Health. The
Ministry of Health then sponsors an audit of the provincial health insurance
nonprofit. If all information reported
is accurate, then the Minister of Health, under the authority of the Governor
in Council, reimburses the provincial health nonprofit for all of the publicly
insured health care expenses incurred in the province that year. The Governor in Council then reports the
national annual spending on health care to the House of Parliament and the
Senate, which determines the national budget for the Medicare system and the
tax rate for health care. The system’s greatest
achievement is that Philip LaFayette would have ideally received the same high
level of medical care if he were a businessman in Toronto, or a commercial
fisherman in British Columbia.
The
treatment of health care as a basic right is responsible for the high standard
of health in Canada, as shown by the following indicators from 1999: The life
expectancy at birth was 78.2 years; the fertility rate was 1.6 births per
woman, the infant mortality rate was 6.1 per 1,000 live births, and there was
negligible malnutrition for children under 5 years.[iii] But despite these signs of a healthy
population, the health care system is ailing.
Challenges
to the Medicare System
“The
fundamental flaw of the [Canadian] Medicare system is that patients bear no
direct costs for the medical services they receive.”
--David Gratzer
The state
of the Canadian Medicare system has become the nation’s foremost political
issue. Despite the successes of the
system complaints, flaws, and suggestions are procuring the most attention. The system is founded on humanistic
principals, but is plagued by a flaw of human nature: in a free-care system,
there is virtually no personal accountability.
The
increasing level of national dissatisfaction in the Canadian Medicare system is
alarming to health care professionals and policy makers. In 2001, only one in five Canadians thought
the Medicare system was working well.
In 1998, 80% of Canadians thought the system needed at least fundamental
changes; and three years later, 18% believed the system required complete
rebuilding. Also in 2001, 26% of
Canadians claimed that their access to health care had deteriorated over the
previous two years.[iv]
The
primary cause for dissatisfaction is the pattern of extensive queuing in the
health care system. Long waits for medical
attention result from overuse of the health care system. Consider the following queuing estimates to
see the source of dissatisfaction:
“It takes nearly 25 weeks
to get an appointment with an ophthalmologist in Canada, almost 21 weeks to
receive orthopedic care, more than 18 weeks to get a heart by-pass, over 16
weeks to see a neurosurgeon, and nearly 12 weeks for a gynecological exam.”[v]
Another
source of dissatisfaction is the apparent breach of one of the Canada Health
Act’s five principals; universality.
Studies have shown the existence of class disparities in the provision
of health care in Canada. One study,
conducted by the Commonwealth Foundation in 2001, found that 23% of Canadians
with below national average income thought the health care system needed to be
rebuilt, whereas only 13% of those with above national average income thought
the system needed to be rebuilt.[vi] Likewise, 47% of those earning under $25,000
wanted a private health insurance option for Medicare, whereas only 39% of those
earning over $75,000 wanted such an option.[vii] These results show that the lower
socioeconomic groups are not as satisfied with their access to services as are
the upper socioeconomic groups. The
lower classes reported more difficulty accessing insured care; especially
off-hours and specialty care. This
could possibly be attributed to the upper class members’ greater abilities to
advocate for themselves.[viii] The lower classes also had trouble obtaining
uninsured elective health services, such as dental, optometry, medical
equipment, and prescription drug services because they would have to pay for
these services from their own funds.
Many in the upper classes now have private insurance to cover these
expenses, but the poor usually cannot afford supplemental insurance.[ix]
The cost
of health care is climbing rapidly, not only for consumers, but also for the
entire system. The national cost of
health care in 1998 was 55.6 billion dollars, which is 6.32% of the Gross
Domestic Product.[x] This is a smaller fraction of the GDP than
the US system spends on their health care system; however, the Canadian system
has hidden costs, such as the loss of productivity due to queuing.[xi] A study by Foot and Stoffman found that,
“Canada’s health spending nearly doubled between the mid-1980’s and mid-1990’s,
but there was no evidence that people were healthier as a result.”[xii] These findings imply that the extra spending
has gone to ineffective administration of the system. In individual provinces, where most of the administering is done,
30% of the annual provincial budgets are portioned to health care. Unfortunately, these discouraging figures
are on the early slope of a gathering wave.
Canada’s
birth rate is low, and its mortality rate is also low. This recipe will yield a glut of seniors
when the baby-boomers reach those years, accompanied by a small work force to
support them. By 2030 the population of
seniors will be equivalent to 40% of the working population, which must cover
their health costs. Canadians over 65 currently
use about half of all health care expenditures.[xiii] Foot and Stoffman observe:
“By the time you are in
your late 70s, you will use hospitals five times more than your life-time
average rate of use. If you survive
until your late 80’s, you will use hospitals 12 times more than your lifetime
average.”[xiv]
The amount
of usage of the health care system is exactly the problem. There is not one group in the system to
blame; they all contribute to its inefficiency. Beginning with the first-tier of the system, we can see that
consumers are overconsuming. In a
free-care system, expense is not a consideration; only convenience
matters. For example, when given the
option to receive immediate attention in the ER, or wait for a less expensive
appointment with a physician, the tendency is to choose the ER because it is
more convenient. “In 1997, the Regina
Health District found that from 43-49% of the ER patients in its three
hospitals were nonurgent cases.”[xv] In the 1973 New England Journal of Medicine article, “Distribution,” by
Enterline et al., it was found that before Medicare, patients called their
doctors for free consultation on minor problems, but immediately after Medicare
was introduced, phone calls dropped, and personal free visits increased by the
same percentage. In another New England Journal of Medicine article
titled, “Effects,” also by Enterline, et al., it was found that physicians in
Quebec believed that since the introduction of Medicare, frivolous patient
complaints rose by 75%.[xvi] Also in Quebec, in the first two years after
Medicare was introduced, the amount of time physicians spent with each patient
dropped by 16%, and the number of patients seen per day increased by 32%.[xvii] This shows that the number of patients
increased dramatically, but also, doctors’ behaviors changed.
In the
Medicare system, doctors are paid on a fee-for-service basis. Due to the high national cost of health
care, each service is assigned a relatively low rate of compensation. Low compensation, and overwhelming demand
for services, are disincentives for providers.
As a result, there are few Canadian medical students; and of the ones
who become doctors, many leave Canada for the greener pastures of the American
health care system. Canadian doctors
have one primary way to raise their incomes; raise the number of patients they
see.
A major
trend in physician overprovision is requiring multiple patient visits, when
fewer visits would suffice. Not only is
the doctor/patient relationship strained by the shorter, incomplete visits, but
also the patient is removed from the work force and made to suffer from his or
her ailments longer by having to make multiple visits. Here is an example of overprovision:
“In Ontario, it was
reported that over 200 family physicians had billed the government for more
than $400,000 each in 1994-95 (Bohuslawsky, “Patient Overdose”). These high-billing doctors had pushed
through an average of 67 patients a day, or one every eight minutes.”[xviii]
The RAND
Health Insurance Experiment, conducted on 2,000 families in the U.S., between
1974-1982 tested for overprovision as a result of health systems. One group of patients with free-care
coverage paid on a fee-for-service basis, like the Canadian model. The other group of patients with free-care
coverage had HMO plans, in which the providers got paid a capitated (flat)
fee. Expenditures in the
fee-for-service group were 28% higher, and hospital admissions and days spent
in the hospital were 40% higher than for the HMO coverage group.[xix] The only difference was that doctors had an
incentive to overprovide for the fee-for-service group. A more disquieting version of this
experiment was conducted by Blomqvist.
He found that in California, when surgeons were paid on a
fee-for-service basis, the number of hysterectomies (removal of the uterus) was
five times higher than when surgeons were paid a flat salary.[xx] Although these experiments were conducted
outside of Canada, and now have some years behind them, they still reveal the
negative trends of overprovision, which are applicable to the Canadian system.
Overprovision
and overconsumption are manifestations of a system that needs fixing. Hospital administrators, and politicians are
also responsible for the problems in Canadian health care. Hospital expenses account for 40% of
provincial health costs. For this
reason, hospital reform has been the focus of health officials for almost a
decade.[xxi] Other attempted repairs such as reducing
medical payments, and limiting the time doctors can spend performing surgery,
have come up short.[xxii] Politicians tend to point out obvious
faults, and pour money into fixing them.
This looks good to the public, whereas addressing the messy roots of
problems looks bad. Perhaps this is
partly responsible for why attempted solutions are treating the symptoms, and
not the system.
Reform
In April
2001, the Canadian Prime Minister appointed former Saskatchewan Premier Roy
Romanow to head a Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada. The ensuing 18 month, $10 million
investigation, which gathered information and public input from tens of
thousands of Canadians, culminated on November 28, 2002 with the release of
Romanow’s final report, Building on
Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada.
The
question addressed was the almost frantic question reverberating throughout
Canada, “What shall we do to sustain our health care system?” The most striking recommendation that
Romanow made was a drastic input of national funds into the Canadian Medicare
system. The report was a profound
message that Canada should not regress from the accomplishments of the Medicare
system toward a hybrid privatized system; Canada should commit to restoring its
national health care system to meet the ideals that it set out to achieve many
years ago.
Romanow’s
report makes the recommendations that he feels Canadians would agree with for
restoring the medicare system.[xxiii] Each recommendation is thoroughly explained,
given a timeline, and given an estimated cost.
But it is the cost that has alarmed Canadians. Romanow recommends that the government cover a minimum of 25% of
the cost of insured health services by 2005/2006 and it should sustain this
funding floor in the future. In
addition to this, Romanow has called for an initial surge of funds to get
Canada back on a track for sustainability.
The additional funding should be above forecasted federal funding by
$3.5 billion in 2003/2004, $5 billion in 2004/2005, and $6.5 billion in
2005/2006, which is a surge of $15 billion.[xxiv] In his statement to the nation about his
final report, he emphasizes this passage:
“But I want to make one
thing absolutely clear. The new money
that I propose investing in health care is to stabilize the system over the
short-term, and to buy enduring change over the long-term. I cannot say often enough: that the status
quo IS NOT AN OPTION! If the only
result of these past 18 months of collective effort by Canadians is simply more
dollars for health care, our time will have been wasted.”[xxv]
These
renewal funds will go to the following five new programs to regenerate the
sustainability of the Medicare system:
·
A Rural
and Remote Access Fund ($1.5B total over 2 years): to improve timely access to care in rural
and remote areas.
·
A
Diagnostic Services Fund ($1.5B total over 2 years): to improve wait times for diagnostic services.
·
A Primary
Health Care Transfer ($2.5B over 2 years): to support efforts to
remove obstacles to renewing primary care delivery.
·
A Home
Care Transfer ($2B over 2 years): to provide a foundation for an eventual national homecare strategy.
·
A
Catastrophic Drug Transfer ($1B beginning in FY 2004/5): to protect
Canadians in instances where they require expensive drug therapies to remain
healthy.[xxvi]
Romanow
expands on some of these recommendations in his speech. He makes several recommendations for
improving access and quality of care.
One suggestion is an improved data collection system to help provinces
collect health outcomes information, and to report regularly to other provinces
so that the nation acts together to improve.
A national personal electronic health record will improve efficiency,
accuracy, and security in keeping patient records. A coordinated wait list management system between health care
centers will provide more reliable wait time estimates and reduce wait
times. Attention to long-term human
resources strategies will attune administrators to the evolving needs of supply
and demand in the health sector.[xxvii]
To address
the challenges posed by the rapidly advancing pharmaceutical industry and
rising drug costs, Romanow makes three suggestions: There should be a
catastrophic drug transfer to help provinces provide funding for prescriptions
in cases where drugs become crucial to a consumer’s health. Currently many Canadians have no drug coverage,
and the majority of those without coverage are poor. The establishment of a national drug agency could monitor the
pharmaceutical industry to improve costs, safety, and knowledge about drugs. And the drug patent legislation should be
refined to allow for purchasing of generic versions of drugs immediately after
new drug patents run out.[xxviii]
One of the
thematic grievances about modernized health systems is the loss of home care
services. In Canada, where doctors are
paid on a fee-for-service basis, home care is especially neglected. But research has found the obvious, that
home care is very valuable to improving health for many people. In particular, home mental health care,
post-acute home care, and palliative home care demand attention. Romanow suggests the establishment of a
national home care system.[xxix] This will become increasingly important as
the population ages.
Romanow
makes many smaller recommendations; forty-seven of them in total. In addition to recommendations, he issues
observations, warnings and requests, which make his final report an
approachable, sensible, and sensitive document. He warns politicians that inter-provincial bickering over health
care is deleterious and he requests cooperation. This request has already been denied, especially by Quebec. Quebec traditionally prefers to be more
autonomous than other provinces, and is upset by the centrality of Romanow’s
recommendations. The province would
very much like the extra funding Romanow proposes, but would like it with no
strings attached so that it can use the funds in its own way. Alberta is also unhappy with Romanow’s
request that all provinces report the precise usage of its federal funds.[xxx] These provinces feel that they can better
attend to its peoples’ health care needs with less patriarchal central
monitoring.
Another
warning that Romanow issues is that if Canada does not renew the sustainability
of Medicare, then the system will succumb to the privatized sector. He states:
“The grave risk we will
face is pressure for access to private, parallel services – one set of services
for the well off, another for those who are not. Canadians do not want this.”[xxxi]
Romanow
holds strongly to the ideals of the Canadian system; universality, equity, and
quality. His commission’s nationally
engaging, comprehensive, transparently presented investigation, and its clearly
written, persuasive final report present to Canadians what is nearly the most
accessible evaluation of the medicare system possible. While there have been many other suggestions
for improving the Canadian health care system, Romanow’s recommendations seem
to construct a track toward sustainability.
Implications
At the end
of his statement to the nation, Roy Romanow issues this pointed counsel:
“Many of the so-called “new
solutions” being proposed for health care – pay-as-you-go, user and facility
fees, fast-track treatment for the lucky few, and wait-lists for everyone else
– are not new at all. We’ve been there. They are old solutions that didn’t work then,
and were discarded for that reason. And
the preponderance of evidence is that they will not work today.”[xxxii]
Romanow
clearly has his biases. Although his
recommendations are supported by evidence, it would be unfortunate to dismiss
other “new solutions.” One new solution
that is gradually garnering support from medical economists, is what Romanow
would perhaps refer to as a pay-as-you-go model. A new Catastrophe Insurance/Medical Savings Account model of
health care coverage could have profound implications for Canada. And even if this model is not eventually
utilized to rebuild Canada’s health care system, exploring it will surely hold
lessons. The Catastrophe/MSA model has
also been looked at in the US as a way to reduce health care costs in a completely
privatized system. For this reason, it
will be valuable for other countries, such as India, which has a highly
privatized system, to consider the Catastrophe/MSA model.
The
Catastrophe Insurance/Medical Savings Account Model
“We
generally rely on insurance to protect us against events that are highly
unlikely to occur but involve large losses if they do occur—major catastrophes,
not minor regularly occurring expenses.
We insure our houses against loss from fire, not against the cost of
having to cut the lawn.”[xxxiii]
--Milton Friedman
Health
insurance around the world has become an integral part of health care
systems. Yet, it has evolved its own
definition of insurance. Health
insurance policies that cover everything from family planning to geriatrics are
costly, and may not be the best means to paying for health care. From the U.S.’s privatized health care
system, to Canada’s universal health care system, to systems in developing
nations, a new model is emerging to challenge the current health insurance
paradigm.
Many
health economists are recommending a restoration of health insurance to its
original purpose. It is far more
cost-effective for an employer, or country, to purchase a high-deductible
catastrophe medical plan for its dependents, rather than purchasing a
comprehensive plan, which covers a lot of services not used. The money saved from switching to a
catastrophe medical plan, would be deposited into a Medical Savings Account (MSA). An MSA is a tax-exempt account that can be
used to pay for approved medical services of the holder’s choice. The result is, instead of putting money into
a comprehensive insurance plan, where unused money goes to the insurance
company, the account holder pays for his own services and keeps the unused
money. This new catastrophe
insurance/MSA model has promising implications backed by empirical evidence.
The
previously mentioned RAND Health Insurance Experiment also tested consumer
paying models. One group received free
care, like in the Canadian system. The
other group was given money, and had to pay for their medical services (user
fee group). It was found that the free
care group was 28% more likely to use medical services, 67% more likely to see
a doctor, and 30% more likely to be admitted to the hospital, with 20% more
days per year of restricted activity than those who were in the user fee
group. It costs 45% more to have a free
care system. And there was no difference found in the overall health of either
group.[xxxiv]
Similarly,
Lohr et al. (1996) found that a cost-sharing scheme, like the catastrophe/MSA
model, reduced the use of both necessary and unnecessary medical services. Yet there was no decrease in the health of
the individuals surveyed. Their
hypothesis is that unnecessary medical visits can be adverse to your health,
resulting in necessary visits. When you
eliminate both, there is no net change in health.[xxxv]
The
natural conclusion to draw from these studies is that when consumers must spend
their own money on health care, they spend it more prudently than when they are
spending the government’s or insurance company’s money.
The
Canadian government could introduce a catastrophe insurance/MSA health care
system, in which it pays for catastrophe insurance for each citizen, and gives
each citizen an MSA stipend based on his or her health, age, and socio-economic
class. The catastrophe insurance would
relieve the anxiety-producing risk of major medical expenses. And the MSA’s would reintroduce a
competitive market to the health care system.
A
competitive market drives progress through efficiency and incentives. Consumers would benefit most because the
affects of change are amplified most at the end of a cascade. They would likely spend less on health care
because they would be accountable for their own expenses. These expenses could include currently
uninsured services, such as dental, home care, and medical supplies. This freedom would be beneficial to the sick
and the poor who currently have trouble paying for prescriptions and other
uninsured services.[xxxvi] Fewer visits to the doctor would allow
consumers more time to participate in the work force. At the end of each year they could withdraw the money in their
MSA’s as taxable income, or they could roll it over into their accounts for the
next year. Less spending would mean
lower national health costs, leading to lower taxes for consumers. Less consumption would resolve the queuing
problem and raise consumer satisfaction by giving them faster access to medical
services. They would also likely be
more discerning over who provides their medical services.
The
catastrophe insurance/MSA model would restore doctor/patient
relationships. Patients would choose
their providers carefully and know about their doctors before they went in for
appointments. Lower demand on services
would give doctors more time to spend with their patients. This would give them time to develop
relationships with their patients, educate their patients, and address medical
complaints that in the current system would require multiple patient
visits. Increased patient selectivity
would bolster competition between physicians to provide better care to attract
more patients. This incentive would
raise provider salaries, which in turn would make medicine a more attractive
career field. Medical school admissions
would likely rise, and the resultant doctor to patient ratio would improve,
thus potentially leading to better national health.
Several
nations are already using catastrophe insurance/MSA options to optimize their
national health. The private sector in
the U.S. is gradually implementing such plans, to high reported levels of
success. Singapore and China have
catastrophe insurance/MSA options.
Shaunn Matisonn of the National Center for Policy Analysis discusses
South Africa’s experience with such plans:
“For most of the last
decade [the nineties]…South Africa enjoyed what was probably the freest market
for health insurance anywhere in the world…In just five years, MSA plans
captured half the [private insurance] market…attract[ing] individuals of all
different ages and different degrees of health.”[xxxvii]
Success in
other nations, empirical evidence, and advising from medical economists
strongly support the new health care systems model of catastrophe insurance
with MSA’s. The dust storm of politics
over the current state of Medicare, makes such a change difficult to see in the
near future for Canada. However, this
model could emerge as a solution for other countries.
Conclusion
The
Canadian Medicare system has been a grand experiment in health care
systems. It has succeeded for many
years, and it has set an example for the rest of the world, both in its
successes and its failings. Current
trends allude to its eventual collapse.
In order for Canada to regain the sustainability of its touted health
care system, there will need to be fundamental changes to its structure. Roy Romanow’s very thorough report, Building on Values: The Future of Health
Care in Canada, makes a complete collection of recommendations for
refurbishing the health care system that was once Canada’s jewel. If the recommendations are followed closely
with minimal political interruption, then it seems that they could lead Canada
back onto the track for sustainability in its health care system. The forthcoming, honest, comprehensive
methodology used by the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada
during its study should provide a model to other countries for how to properly
evaluate and confront national health care issues. Meanwhile, a growing group of health economists are adhering to
the catastrophe insurance/MSA model.
Other nations can learn a great deal from the ideas and methodologies that
are emerging in this period of transition for the Canadian health care system.
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